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The legislation of the majority of countries recognizes that the list'
of incompetent persons under disability is limited.' Numerous codes
contain almost the same enumeration of incompetent persons as the
French code, characterizing as incompetent the minor, the insane per-
son who has been declared incompetent, occasionally the spendthrift
placed under judicial guardianship, the person conivicted of certain
offences, and the married woman, for certain acts. Every other per-
son is considered capable of validly contracting. This rule is accepted
as a matter of public policy. It is not admitted that a person by his
own voluntary or unilateral act may become incompetent. It is neces-
sary to accord the protection resulting from incompetence to persons
only who, by reason of their mental state (as the insane or the minor)
or of their social status (as the convict), ought not to be able to contract
with entire freedom.
There may, however, be certain exceptions to this principle. Thus,
in French law it is quite generally admitted that the married woman
who has adopted the dowry system is thereby rendered incapable of
disposing of the dowry.
2
Outside of these very limited cases which are of special interest to
a few countries only, a person cannot effectively agree that he will
.thenceforth be incompetent or that his existing incapacity shall be aug-
mented. Thus, in French law a married woman cannot enter into a
contract in many cases without being authorized thereto by her husband
or by the courts.3 She cannot augment her incapacity by agreeing ir
her marriage contract that she shall not be capable, even with the consent
* Professor Demogue's manuscript was translated from the French by Professor
Edwin M. Borchard of the Yale Law School.
'In this sense art. 1123 of the French Civil Code reads: "All persons are capable
of contracting unless made incapable by law." Art. 1105 of the Italian, art. 1363
of the Dutch, art. 29 of the Chilean, and art. 1282 of the Mexican Civil Codes have
reenacted this article textually. Art. 320 (2) of the Spanish Civil Code is inspired
by the same idea, for it reads: "The adult is capable of performing every act of
civil life, subject to the exceptions of this code." So the Portuguese code (art.
644) : "All persons not excepted by law are capable of contracting." So the Swiss
Civil Code: "Whoever can exercise civil rights is capable of acquiring and of obli-
gating himself." (art. 12) ; "Every adult person capable of discretion (di.scerne-
inent) may exercise civil rights." (art 13)
'8 Aubry and Rau, Droit Civil Frangais (5th ed. 1916) 563.
'Civil Code, arts. 217, 219.
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of her husband or of the court, of obligating herself toward third
persons. That has been deemed by the courts as contrary to public
policy.4 Or a person cannot agree to render himself incapable of sign-
ing a certain class of contracts without the authorization of a third
person. Conversely, a minor female who marries cannot by her mar-
riage contract cause her capacity to be recognized as if she were an
adult.5
This general principle being admitted, a question presents itself which
does not seem to have been settled by legislation in the various coun-
tries, at least in any general way. At times, in order that a transaction
concluded between two persons shall produce all the effects anticipated,
it is necessary that one of the contracting parties estop or disable him-
self from undertaking certain other acts. Is an agreement of this kind
valid, and if so, what is its legal operation?
I
We may begin by citing an example, namely, an insurance contract.
The contracts of insurance against injury or damage to the insured or
against liability of the insured have multiplied astonishingly during the
last century. One of the dangers which they present, however, is that
the insured, certain of being indemnified in case of injury or damage,
is inclined to become less prudent and careful. To overcome this, it
is agreed in certain insurance policies that the insurance company
assumes liability to indemnify only for the greater part of the risk.
For the rest, it is agreed that the insured will bear his -own loss and he
stipulates that he will not insure this fractional risk with any other com-
pany. For example, the insurance covers three quarters of the possible
loss, and the insured remains his own insurer, so to speak, for the other
quarter. This clause permits the company to reduce its risks arising
from the insured's imprudence. The insured is no longer exposed to
unlimited risk, yet he has an interest in preventing any loss." We
believe that such an agreement not to contract must be deemed valid in
France and in any other country where there is no express legislation to
the contrary.
But what may be the practical effect of this stipulation against enter-
ing into certain contracts? If it produced genuine incompetence or
incapacity, the system would be simple. A second insurance taken out
in spite of the stipulation would be void. It would require merely
fixing the nature of this nullity-whether it may be invoked by every
interested person or merely by the disabled~person himself. In any
' Court of Cassation, Ch'ambre Civile, Dec. 22, 1879, Sirey, 188o, I, 125.
"Tribunal de la Seine, Jan. 11, 1911. Receuil de la Gazette des Tribunaux, 1911,
First semester, 2. 217. and Cour de Paris, Dec. 27, 1911; Gazette du Palais, 1912,
I, 206.
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event, this incapacity might be invoked by the new insurer, even if he
were ignorant of the first policy and of the stipulation against a second
policy contained therein.
The idea of conventional incapacity being inadmissible, how can we
support the prohibition of entering into contracts? The court must
establish that the insured has violated his contract and if he has thereby
contemplated the renunciation of the rights of the insured for failure to
observe this clause in the policy, the court will declare that the company
is under no duty to the insured. But if the policy is silent, what posi-
tion can the insurance company take? It is certain that whoever vio-
lates an obligation of this sort may be obliged to pay damages equal to
the injury which he has caused. But how shall we establish the injury
resulting from the second insurance? The court cannot ordinarily
establish that the loss would not have occurred if there had only been a
partial insurance. The damages here will then bear no exact relation
to the injury. It would accord with this idea that the prohibition
embodied in the contract cannot be violated with impunity. We must
then conclude that the court will fix the damages arbitrarily. 6
Aside from this right, can the first insurer bring an action against the
second insurer? If the latter had acted in bad faith, knowing that the
second insurance was forbidden by the first, one might apply to him the
principle enunciated by the courts in recent years, namely, whoever with
knowledge aids a contractor in violating his contract is responsible
towards the other contracting party for such violation. He may be
sued as a tort feasor.7 But if it may be said by virtue of this princi-
ple that the contract is void, the second insurer will profit thereby, if a
loss occurs, by finding himself relieved from paying the indemnity
which he promised. It might be declared that the second insurer is
liable jointly with the insured for the damages which the latter owes to
the first insurer. But this would hardly be useful, for the first insurer,
who often has no knowledge of the second insurance until after a loss
has occurred, will pay himself by retaining from the indemnity which he
owes the insured the amount thus due him.
'[In the United States the legal consequences of such an insurance contract
would seem to be as follows: the insured would owe a duty to the insurer not to
make another contract of insurance; he would have the legal power, neverthe-
less, to make such a second contract (a power without the privilege of exercising
it is not uncommon). Inasmuch as money damages for breach of this duty would
not be adequate, exact performance thereof would be held to be a condition prece-
dent to the duty of the insurer to pay (the plaintiff's breach of duty not to insure
further would go to the essence). The final result would be that the second
contract is valid, but the first insurer is no longer boun---Ed.]
'See on this subject the monograph of M. Pierre Hugueney, La Responsabiliti
du Tiers Complice de la Violation d'une Obligation Contractuelle (191o).
[The doctrine of Lumnley v. Gye (1853, Q." B.) 2 El. & B1. 216, would not be
extended so far as this in the United States, particularly if the first insurer is
discharged.-Ed.]
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If the second insurer acted in good faith, the first could under no cir-
cumstances .bring an action against him. Thus the contractual capacity
of the insured being unaffected by his private agreement, the second
insurance taken out, notwithstanding the first, remains valid.
II
An analogous difficulty may present itself with respect to clauses in
contracts by which the debtor promises not to contract like debts. A
company issuing bonds may promise its subscribers not to issue a new
loan by way of bonds until the first shall have been fully repaid. This
promise may be of great importance to capitalists, for they may fear
that if loans by the issue of bonds be multiplied, the liabilities of the
company may not be fully paid in case the business goes badly. The
promise not to issue new obligations is very valuable, but it does not
render the company incompetent to issue new bonds. If the new
holders had known of the promise made by their debtor their claims in
case of the latter's bankruptcy could *not be pressed so as to injure the
old holders, for they are in effect responsible to the old 'bond holders
for the wrong which they have committed. But if the new bond hold-
er§ had acted in good faith, they could claim reimbursement on even
terms in case of bankruptcy. The old bond holders could then merely
sue the managers of the company who committed the wrong of issuing
a new loan.
III
'A somewhat different question may present itself when the by-laws
of an association forbid the directors to undertake certain operations.,
Thus it may be provided in the by-laws that the company may not issue
bonds except for a sum equal to three times the corporate capital; or
it may be provided that the company shall not purchase immovables or
realty except for cash. These clauses may be very useful, for they
oblige the directors to exercise more prudence in the management of
the corporate affairs. The question of the legal operation of these
clauses deserves particular attention. It may be said, as in the pre-
ceding case, that the association was unable to render itself incompetent,
for incapacity cannot be created by contract either for a corporation or
for a physical person.
But a complication exists, involving the nature of the corporate
entity. When a corporation is created it may be endowed for a cer-
tain purpose to the exclusion of all others; for example, the purchase of
realty, the development of a certain industry, etc. We may likewise
' Here we use the word director, as well the word manager, in its widest sense.
We have in mind a person who alone or with others directs or manages any com-
mercial association, whether stock corporation or not. Impliedly we include a
person who manages the property of an association or foundation.
23
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limit the means by which a corporation may attain its objects; for
example, it may be forbidden to undertake certain operations except
for cash. Have these rules, established at the very inception of the
corporation, thereby acquired such force that they are imposed abso-
lutely upon third persons, even those acting in good faith? May one
say that the corporation has been created only within the limits fixed by
its by-laws, and for the acts contemplated therein, so that acts prohibited
would be considered as concluded by a corporation having in reality no
existence when it undertakes the forbidden act?
If the law. itself forbids a corporation to undertake a certain act, the
law thereby being violated, the act may be attacked as void. This the
French courts have recognizedY
Would it be the same if the rule violated was merely a conventional
rule-that by which the company was created?
A conflict arises here between the interests of the members of the
association or third persons who have dealt with the association in the
light of its known by-laws and, on the other hand, the interests of third
persons who have concluded a contract with the company, which,
according to its by-laws, was ultra vires. The legislation of certain
countries has in this case favored the third persons. The German Com-
mercial Code of 189710 provides that the clauses of by-laws designed
to restrict the powers of the manager have no effect as against third
persons, but only among the contracting members of the association.
"The stipulation which restricts the power of one of the members to
represent an association has no effect as against third persons, espec-
ially the restriction by which the power of representing the association
extends only to certain matters, or can be exercised only in certain
circumstances for a certain time, or in certain places."
The Hungarian Commercial Code likewise provides :"
"Every restriction upon the power of a member of an association to
represent the legal entity is void as against third persons."
This also is provided in article 216 (3) of the Venezuelan Commer-
cial Code, in article 373 (I) of the Chilean Commercial Code, and in
article 16 of the Swedish Law of June 28th, 1895, on commercial
associations. Under these conditions third persons may deal with the
association with entire safety. The German authors even admit that
the limitations of power cannot be set up against third persons who
knew of them . 2 Thus bad faith would seem to be rewarded. More-
'Court of Cassation, Chambre Civile, May 26, 1894, Sirey, 1894, I, 265.
"Art. 126 (2), re-enacting art. I6 of the old code.
I Art. 92.
123 Cosack, Droit Commercial (French transl. 19o7) 29; Lehmann, Handels-
recht, 308.
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over, even without admitting this untoward solution, we compel the
association to run serious risks if its managers should not be scrupulous
men.
Other codes have found a means of reconciling within certain limits
these conflicting interests. The Swiss Code of Obligations13 says in
effect:
"Every clause which would limit the powers of an associate is null
and void with respect to third persons acting in good faith. There is
excepted the case where, after inscription of the association in the
commercial register, the association can be bound only by the collective
signature of several associates."
The method of reconciliation, therefore, consists in taking account
of the good faith of the contractor and, to a certain extent, of the pub-
licit given the act of association. This is a system closely approach-
ing the one arrived at in countries where legislation has not regulated
this matter.
Commercial associations are in the majority of countries subjected by
legislation to certain forms of publicity. In France the important law
of July 24 th, 1867,'4 requires of associations an extensive publicity
either by the registration of their articles of association and by-laws
with the clerks of certain courts, or by the publication in the newspapers
of extracts from their by-laws. A similar system is provided for by
several foreign codes. 5 In other states publicity is provided for by
means of inscription in the commercial register.' 6
When the publicity given to the by-laws of the association easily per-
mits third persons to obtain knowledge that a certain act cannot be
undertaken in the name of the association by its managers, if legisla-
tion, as in France, has not provided for acts ultra vires committed by the
managers, we may posit the following principle: third persons who
deal with the association know, or ought to know, that the by-laws for-
bid a certain act. If they are ignorant, it is their own fault. Conse-
quently when a clause has been duly published limiting the powers of
the managers, it may be invoked against third persons. This solution,
which by a middle course reconciles, the security of the association with
that of third persons, appears to us possible of adoption in all countries
where the question has not been settled by legislation.17
"Art 561. " Art. 55, 56, et seq.5 E. g., the Roumanian Commercial Code, art. 92; the Italian Commercial Code,
art. go, et seq.; the Dutch Commercial Code, art. 23, et seq.; the Chilean Com-
mercial Code, art. 354; and the Belgian Law of May i8, 1873, art. 6.8 This is the case with the Spanish Commercial Code, art. i6, et seq.; the Argen-
tine Commercial Code, art. 36, et seq.; and the Mexican Commercial Code, art. ig.
ITI Thaller and Pic, Sociftis (i9o8) see. 479; i Vidari, Diritto Commerciale
(5th ed. 19oo) see. iO62; 4 Navarrini, Diritto Commerciale (igo8) sec. 1643; I
Lacour, Droit Commercial, sec. 302.
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This is the solution adopted in France by the Court of Cassation in
a case where the corporate by-laws forbade the associates to issue notes
or to sign any drafts obligating the association, even with the concur-
rence of other associates and under penalty of being null and void as
against third parties. The court said :18
"It is within the power of the contracting parties to limit in their
collective or individual interest the powers of the managers of the
association by forbidding them to undertake certain predetermined acts.
This obligatory prohibition laid upon the associates may likewise be
set up against third persons by reason of the publicity which the articles
of association have received."
If, on the contrary, publicity has not taken place, the clause cannot
be set up against third persons. This also the Court of Cassation has
decided when confronted with a formal provision of articles of asso-
ciation according to which the associates could not sign notes for the
purchase of merchandise "when it was not duly established that this
clause was included in the publication which alone could render it possi-
ble to set it up against third persons.
'19
In all these cases in which the mere examination of the contract pro-
posed to third persons makes it possible in the light of the by-laws to
determine whether the contract is valid, it is the fact of publicity, or
non-publicity, of the articles that determines the issue against or in
favor of third persons.
Moreover, even when the clause was not published, if it is estab-
lished in fact that the third person knew the provisions of articles and
by-laws, the third person in bad faith cannot be protected and his claim
against the association cannot be recognized.
2 0  If the third person
cannot enforce his contract because there was publication of the clause
violated or because he acts in bad faith, he can only sue the association
for enrichment to the extent still enjoyed by the latter by reason of the
contract when the action is brought.
The question is complicated when we are unable to determine whether
the contract offered to a third person conforms with the articles of
association except by means of an examination of facts. This would
be the case if the articles indicate that the manager of the association
can borrow in the name of the association only if he acts in corporate
matters. Does such a clause render void an act concluded with a third
person in good faith, by the mere fact that it was .published? If the
affirmative is admitted, we require from third persons a very minute
"Chambre Cizle, Dec. 22, 1874, Dalloz, 1875, I, 255.
Chambre des Requites, August 16, 1875, Dalloz, 1876, I, 422. So in Belgium,
Bruxelles, March 17, I881, Pasicrisie, 1881, II, 349.
" Chavibre des Requtes, Oct 31, 1887, Dalloz, 1888, I, 472; Douai, March 7,
1899, Dalloz, i9o2, I, 6; 1 Thaller and Pic, Sociftis (i9o8) sec. 479.
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examination of facts. Certain authors also declare that the clause can-
not be invoked against third persons in good faith.2 1 The Court of
Cassation appears, however, to adopt a contrary solution,22 and to con-:
sider as effective the "intention of the contracting parties to remove
from the liabilities of the association every obligation or debt which
one of the associates might incur for causes foreign to the association
even when the associate had made use of the corporate signature."
This solution seems to us dangerous for third persons. It seems to us
that the latter-if in good faith and if they could not by reading the
by-laws determine whether the act they were about to conclude was
regular-must be protected against any action for the nullity of the
contract.
We will add that in the absence of any clause it is admitted that the
managing associate obligates the association even if he borrows for per-
sonal purposes when the third person with whom he deals acts in good
faith. 23 The Court of Cassation has said in this sense that a third per-
son in good faith, when all the circumstances justify him in believing
that the associate used the corporate signature only with the consent of
his associates and in the concerted interest of the association, was a
valid creditor.24  Conversely, it admits that if the third person was in
ignorance of the unlawful conditions under which the associate used the
corporate signature, he cannot be considered a creditor of the associa-
tion.25  It does not seem to us that this system protecting third persons
acting in good faith can be abandoned merely because a clause in the
articles of association imposed on the manager of the association the
duty not to obligate the latter except in corporate matters.
From these particular observations we may deduce a conclusion.
The law recognizes that certain persons are incompetent or without
legal capacity. In that case, this result being based upon public policy,
which requires that incompetents shall not be victimized by reason of
their social status or their mental state, the incapacity reacts against
third persons. The latter are exposed to having rendered void at the
Thaller, Droit Commercial (5th ed. I916) sec. 412; 2 Lyon-Caen and Renault,
Traitg de Droit Commercial (i2th ed. 1918) sec. 293; Percerou, Des Abus de la
Raison Sociale (2898) 12 ANNALES DE DROIT COMMERCIA., II8, 132 et seq.
Chambre des Requites, June 22, i88I, Sirey, i883, I, i58, and Nov. 5, I9OO,
ibid. i9oI, I, 127; I Arthuys, Droit Commercial, sec. 250; I Thaller and Pic,
Sociitjs (19o8) sec. 563.
"In our opinion it would be the same if the member or partner borrowed for
another member or partner personally and did so in the name of the association,
even when the lender knew the situation, if he believed or had reason to believe
that the association had an interest in thus coming to the aid of a member or
partner.
"Chambre de Requztes, Feb. 21, i86o, Sirey, 186o, I, 415.
zChambre Civile, July IX, 1899, Sirey, i9oo, I, 5; cf. I Thaller and Pic, Sociftis
(I9O8) secs..461-462.
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request of the incompetent an act concluded with him, whether or not
they knew of the existing incapacity. But parallel with this system
"there is another which involves a different technical conception. In a
private interest, in order to permit a contract to be carried out more
completely, one may stipulate that a person shall not in the future con-
clude a certain class of contracts. There will not result therefrom a
conventional incapacity, but an obligation upon the promisor with
respect to the promisee and this obligation will react upon third
persons acting in bad faith. But the system is completed by the idea of
publicity. When the law has provided for publication of the clauses in
question, by the mere fact of such publication third persons who might
thereby discover the existence of the clauses are considered as having
knowledge thereof and this presumption is conclusive. 28
Thus we have two somewhat related theories which are both sys-
tematized by their inspiration in practical utility. But the first pur-
sues an aim of public policy, namely, protecting incompetents. The
second merely looks toward a private purpose, whence its less vigorous
character. But both tend to constitute themselves rationally, by form-
ing a body of coherent solutions. The solutions which they present
also have a certain universal validity. They may be proposed in those
rather numerous countries where there is no legislation to the con-
trary.27 Thus we may on this point, as on many others, construct a
certain unity of law among the various peoples.
[In the language of the common law, we may say that there are persons (e. g.,
lunatics in care of a judicially appointed guardian) who wholly lack legal power
and whose agreements are void; there are others (e. g., infants) who have power
to contract, with the accompanying power of avoidance; still others (e. g.,
general agents with private limiting instructions) who have power to bind their
principals only by contracts made with third persons who act in good faith without
notice, actual or constructive.-Ed.]
'It might even be adopted to clarify certain legislative texts which leave the
question obscure, e. g., art. 316 (3) of the Commercial Code of Brazil, according
to which: "If the member or partner abuses the association purpose, an action lies
against him for damages, both on the part of the other associates and of third
persons."
